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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20010443-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1999), and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
10-503(1) (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant where the 
victim's testimony established all the elements of the charged 
crimes, the defendant's presence at the scene was corroborated by 
another witness, the defendant's threats to the victim over the 
phone were overheard by a police officer, and the defendant 
presented no contradictory evidence? 
"In considering an insufficiency-of-evidence claim, [the 
Court] reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. 
Honie, 438 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 2002 UT 4, f44. The Court will 
reverse "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993). The Court may not "re-
evaluate the credibility of witnesses or second-guess the jury's 
conclusion." State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 44. 
2. Has defendant overcome the presumptive constitutional 
validity of trial counsel's strategy for dealing with evidence of 
defendant's prior conviction? Alternatively, has defendant 
demonstrated that counsel's strategy, if constitutionally 
deficient, undermines confidence in the outcome? 
Because no lower court has ruled on defendant's ineffective 
assistance claim, this Court will treat the question as one of law. 
State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, 1 12, 13 P.3d 604. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains copies of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 
76-10-503 (1) (1999) . 
CASE STATEMENT 
On August 16, 2000, the State charged defendant with 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and possession of a 
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dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree felony (R. 
2 and 25)-1 
Before trial, the parties stipulated that defendant had been 
convicted of a violent felony and was on parole (R. 149:4-5). 
After a two day trial, a jury convicted defendant on both counts 
(R. 119-120, R. 150:204). The court sentenced defendant to 
statutory concurrent prison terms of zero to five years for 
aggravated assault and one to fifteen years for possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 126-128). Defendant 
timely appealed (R. 130) . 
FACT STATEMENT2 
On August 16, 2000, defendant, using a gun, attacked Charene 
Martinez in the apartment where she lived with her two- and three-
year-old children. 
Six months earlier. Defendant was a frequent customer at a 7-
Eleven where Ms. Martinez worked, stopping in six or seven times a 
day (R. 149:16-18). However, Ms. Martinez considered him to be 
only a customer, not a friend (R. 149:15-16). She never gave 
defendant her address, phone number, or pager number (R. 149:17). 
Ms. Martinez quit her 7-Eleven ]ob and moved into an apartment six 
defendant's use of a firearm and parolee status raised the 
crime to a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503(2)(a) 
(1999) . 
2The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
3 
months before the attack (id.). she did not see defendant during 
that period. 
The Party. On the night of August 15, 2000, Ms. Martinez 
had a "get together" for some friends in her new apartment (R. 
149:19). At about 9:00 p.m., Ms. Martinez received a telephone 
call from a caller who identified himself as "Josh" (R. 149:18-
19). Martinez had a friend named Josh, but the noise from the 
party and the radio made it difficult for her to identify the 
caller's voice (R. 149:20). The caller said he was going to come 
over and asked for Ms. Martinez's address, which she gave him (R. 
149:20). Josh never showed up that night, and when Ms. Martinez 
later spoke to Josh, he denied ever calling the night of August 
15th (R. 149:20) . 
An Uninvited Visitor. Ms. Martinez and her friend Wes 
Burella began cleaning up from the party in the early hours of 
August 16, 2002 (R. 149:19-20). Her children were in bed and the 
partygoers had all left (R. 149:22, 29). 
Ms. Martinez heard a knock at her front window, but when she 
looked out the window she did not see anybody (R. 149:21). She 
tried to look out the peephole of her door, but someone covered 
the peephole from the outside (R. 149:21). Ms. Martinez assumed 
the knock was one of the partygoers returning to retrieve a lost 
item, and she did not find the covered peephole unusual because 
her friends often made a game of covering the peephole on the 
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door (R. 149:21-22, 52). Ms. Martinez flung the door "wide open" 
and saw defendant standing on her doorstep (R. 14 9:53) . Without 
saying anything, defendant walked into Ms. Martinez's apartment 
and sat down in a chair next to the front door (R. 149:23-24). 
When defendant arrived at Ms. Martinez apartment *[h]is face was 
kind of happy," but when he entered the apartment and saw Mr. 
Burella, his face changed and he appeared "upset about something" 
(R. 149:43). 
Ms. Martinez did not immediately ask defendant to leave 
because she was afraid of him (R. 149:23). Instead, she sat on 
the couch next to Mr. Burella and tried to think of what to do 
(R. 149:26-27). Nobody said anything for a minute, so Ms. 
Martinez decided to call the police (R. 149:26-27). 
As Ms. Martinez walked towards the phone, it rang (R. 
149:27). When Ms. Martinez answered, her sister's boyfriend, 
Chad Studham, and Chad's cousin, Pat, were on the other end (R. 
149:27-28, 55-56, 71). Defendant began talking to Mr. Burella, 
but looked back and forth between Mr. Burella and Ms. Martinez 
while Ms. Martinez spoke on the phone (R. 149:28). As a result, 
Ms. Martinez did not feel comfortable telling Pat about 
defendant's intrusion, so she tried to communicate that something 
was wrong by changing the pitch of her voice (R. 149:28). 
Eventually, Ms. Martinez hung up without saying anything about 
defendant (R. 149:30) . 
5 
The Assault. Ms. Martinez returned to the couch and sat 
next to Mr. Burella hoping to give defendant the impression that 
Mr. Burella was her boyfriend (R. 149:31). At this point, Ms. 
Martinez overheard defendant telling Mr. Burella that " [she] was 
a slut and that [Mr. Burella]'d never get a chance with [her]" 
(R. 149:30). Ms. Martinez told defendant that she was going to 
sleep and put her head down (R. 149:31). Without saying 
anything, defendant got up as if to leave (R. 149:31). He 
approached the couch and said, "This is the last time you fuck me 
bitch" (R. 149:32). He then grabbed Mr. Burella's right hand 
with his left as if to shake his hand and hit Ms. Martinez in the 
face with his right hand (R. 149:31-32). Ms. Martinez' "head 
went back and [her] face started tingling" and "[her] eyes 
started watering" (R. 149:32). 
Ms. Martinez asked defendant why he "kept following [her] 
and why he wouldn't leave [her] alone" (R. 149:33). She got up 
from the couch and walked towards defendant telling him to get 
out of her apartment (R. 149:33). Defendant started walking 
backwards calling Ms. Martinez a "bitch," a "cunt," and a "slut" 
(R. 149:33). Defendant backed into the front door, then opened 
it (R. 149:34) . Standing in the doorway, defendant lifted his 
shirt, drew an automatic pistol from his waistband, and pointed 
it at Ms. Martinez (R. 149:35). Ms. Martinez was walking toward 
defendant and her head hit the barrel as she walked into the gun 
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(R. 149:35). 
At that point, Mr. Burella, who has a smaller frame than Ms. 
Martinez, jumped up from the couch and told defendant to drop the 
gun and leave (R. 149:36). Defendant pulled back the slide on 
the pistol to load a round into the chamber and pushed the gun 
into Ms. Martinez's temple (R. 149:37). Defendant began yelling 
threats at Ms. Martinez, saying that she should die and that "he 
wanted to see [her] insides and outsides or something" (R. 
149:38). Though Ms. Martinez could not remember exactly how long 
defendant held the gun to her head, "[i]t seemed like a long 
time" (R. 149:28). Defendant began walking backwards again, and 
Ms. Martinez seized the opportunity to push him out the doorway 
and to shut and lock the door (R. 149:39). She then pulled Mr. 
Burella to the floor with her and leaned against the door (R. 
149:39). While Ms. Martinez was crouched on the floor, defendant 
pounded on the door and window with his gun, yelled, "Open the 
door," and again called Ms. Martinez a bitch (R. 149:41, 75-76). 
Ms. Martinez again went to the phone. She was so scared 
that she could not remember any phone numbers, so she pressed the 
redial button, which rang her sister, Tosha. (R. 149:40.) Tosha 
answered and told Ms. Martinez to call 911 (R. 149:40). After 
Ms. Martinez hung up with her sister the pounding on the door and 
window stopped (R. 149:41). 
Ms. Martinez called 911 and explained to the operator what 
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had happened. Police were dispatched to her apartment. (R. 
149:40, 95.) 
Chad Studham overheard the telephone conversation between 
Tosha and Ms. Martinez and decided he should check on Ms. 
Martinez (R. 149:80, 83). When Mr. Studham arrived at Ms. 
Martinez's building, he saw defendant walking out the side of the 
building (R. 14 9:83). Mr. Studham knew defendant from prison (R. 
149:78). Mr. Studham shined a spotlight on defendant and saw 
that defendant was wearing shorts and a T-shirt (R. 149:84-85, 
91). Defendant got into a truck and left (R. 149:86, 91). 
Mr. Studham proceeded to Ms. Martinez's apartment (R. 
14 9:87). Ms. Martinez opened the door only after Mr. Studham 
identified himself (R. 149:87). Mr. Studham testified that Ms. 
Martinez was terrified and crying, and that she had a red mark on 
her face (R. 149:87). Ms. Martinez told Mr. Studham what 
happened with defendant and stated that defendant had been 
wearing shorts (R. 149:88). About fifteen minutes later, the 
police arrived (R. 149:88). 
The Investigation* Officer Mark Slade received the report 
of the assault at approximately 1:32 a.m. and responded to Ms. 
Martinez's apartment with at least two other officers (R. 
149:95). Some of the officers questioned Ms. Martinez, Mr. 
Studham, and Mr. Burella about the assault, while others left to 
search for defendant (R. 149:73-74, 96-97). Because more than 
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one officer questioned Ms. Martinez, she felt that she was never 
able to tell the entire story at one time to an individual 
officer (R. 149:73-74). Mr. Burella and Ms. Martinez described 
the assailant as "a male with a shaved head, about 5 feet 10 
inches tall, stocky build, a tattoo under his right eye of a 
tear, a tattoo on the back of his right lower leg that read '13,' 
[and] a goatee that was short" and wearing blue shorts and a T-
shirt (R. 149:99). Mr. Burella and Ms. Martinez separately 
provided consistent accounts of the event to Officer Slade 
(149:99). 
While Officer Slade was at Ms. Martinez's apartment, 
defendant called on the telephone (R. 149:100). (Officer Slade 
later confirmed with dispatch that the number that appeared on 
Ms. Martinez's caller I.D. belonged to defendant (R. 149:46, 103-
104).) Officer Slade listened to the phone conversation between 
Ms. Martinez and defendant on another phone (R. 149:101). Ms. 
Martinez first asked defendant, "Why did you tell me your name 
was Josh?" (R. 149:101). Defendant replied, "I didn't. I said 
my name was Dave." (R. 149:101). Ms. Martinez then asked, "Why 
did you hit me?" (R. 149:101) . Officer Slade heard defendant 
reply, "Well, because-" then pause and state that he wasn't 
stupid (R. 149:45, 102). He then said, "I wasn't at your house. 
You're a lying bitch." (R. 149:45, 102). Ms. Martinez later 
asked defendant, "Why did you hit me and pull a gun at me?" (R. 
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149:102). Defendant replied, "I don't know what you're talking 
about." (R. 149:102). Defendant told Ms. Martinez that she was 
stupid, a bitch, and that she deserved to get smacked (R. 
149:45). Officer Slade heard defendant tell Ms. Martinez, "You 
deserve to get smacked," or something to that effect (R. 149: 
102-103) . Ms. Martinez finally just hung up, but defendant 
called back a few minutes later and said "almost the same thing 
he said the first time" while Officer Slade listened again (R. 
149:46). Defendant called "a couple" of more times after Officer 
Slade left (R. 149:46) . 
A warrant was issued for defendant's arrest, and he was 
apprehended and charged with aggravated assault and possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 1-2). The parties 
stipulated that the trial court would instruct the jury that 
defendant had been convicted of a violent felony and was on 
parole for a felony (R. 149:4-5). When the parties entered the 
stipulation, the trial court commented that the instruction would 
obviate any need to detail the crime (R. 149:4). 
Ms. Martinez, Mr. Studham, and Officer Slade testified for 
the state (R. 149:14-115). (Wes Burrella could not be located 
and did not testify (R. 150:142).) Defendant presented no direct 
evidence. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
1. Sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant has not met his 
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burden to marshal the evidence supporting the ]ury verdicts. 
Specifically, defendant has not presented every "scrap" of 
evidence supporting his conviction, then demonstrated how the 
supporting evidence was insufficient. Instead, defendant weaves 
supporting and contradictory evidence into a single conglomerate. 
When properly marshaled, the evidence is sufficient to support 
the jury's verdict. Ms. Martinez's uncontradicted testimony 
alone supports the verdict. 
Moreover, defendant's argument is legally inadequate to 
support his sufficiency claim. Defendant relies solely on 
alleged disparities between Ms. Martinez's trial testimony, 
preliminary hearing testimony, and police statements. At most, 
the disparities raise a credibility issue. That the jury 
resolved any credibility issues against defendant does not 
demonstrate an insufficiency in the evidence to support its 
verdict. 
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant complains 
that his trial counsel performed ineffectively because he did not 
move to sever the aggravated assault charge from the possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person charge. Without any 
analysis, he concludes that the failure prejudiced him because 
the jury deciding the aggravated assault charge learned that 
petitioner had a prior conviction. 
Defendant has not met his burden on the first element. The 
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record clearly demonstrates that counsel made a strategic 
decision about how to handle the prior conviction. Defendant has 
not acknowledged that decision, let alone attempted to rebut the 
presumption that it was legitimate. 
Defendant also has not demonstrated that any error 
undermines confidence in the outcome. First, defendant has not 
demonstrated that a severance motion would have succeeded. 
Second, defendant has not demonstrated that the jury knowing he 
had a prior conviction for an unspecified felony undermines 
confidence in the outcome of his aggravated assault conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT DISCRETE INCONSISTENCIES 
BETWEEN MS. MARTINEZ'S TRIAL TESTIMONY AND PRIOR 
ACCOUNTS ONLY ASKS THIS COURT INVADE THE JURY'S 
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO RESOLVE CREDIBILITY ISSUES? IT DOES 
NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EVIDENCE, WHEN PROPERLY 
MARSHALED, IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
VERDICT 
In order to succeed on his sufficiency challenge, defendant 
must first marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict, 
then demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is, viewed in the 
light most favorable"to the jury's verdict, "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983), superceded by rule on other grounds by 
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State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987). See also Child 
v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998) ("So long as some 
evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, 
[the court] will not disturb them");L State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 
60, f60, 28 P.3d 1278. 
Defendant has not met his burden to marshal the evidence. 
"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, 
the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App. 1991) . Merely reviewing all the evidence before the fact 
finder is insufficient. Heineck v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 
459, 464 (Utah App. 1991) (finding that defendant failed to 
satisfy marshaling obligation where he "reviewed in minute detail 
all the evidence" and "left it to the court to sort out what 
evidence actually supported the findings"). Rather, "[c]ounsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and 
fully assume the adversary's position." West Valley City, 818 
P.2d at 1315. 
Defendant never presents a single unified compilation of all 
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Defendant's fact 
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statement merely weaves supporting and contradictory evidence 
into a single conglomerate. Aplt. Br. at 7-8, 10-15, 17-18. 
Defendant's argument merely launches directly into an attack on 
Ms. Martinez's credibility. Aplt. Br. 22-25. Defendant's 
failure to meet his marshaling burden independently defeats this 
claim. See, e.g., State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16, 989 P.2d 
1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 
1991) . 
Alternatively, defendant's sufficiency claim fails on the 
properly marshaled evidence. Ms. Martinez testified without 
contradiction that defendant: 1) entered her apartment uninvited; 
2) made threatening statements, such as "this is the last time 
you fuck me, bitch;" 3) slapped her with enough force to make her 
head go "back," make her face tingle, and make her eyes water; 4) 
produced a gun from his waistband when she tried to get defendant 
to leave the apartment; 5) pointed the gun in a way that Ms. 
Martinez hit her head on it when she approached defendant; 6) 
pulled the slide on the gun to load a bullet into the chamber, 
then pushed the gun into Ms. Martinez's temple; and 7) yelled 
that Ms. Martinez should die, and that "he wanted to see [her] 
msides and outsides or something. By itself, Ms. Martinez 
testimony provided "some evidence" on each element of the charged 
crimes. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d at 433. Therefore, by itself, 
14 
her testimony was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.3 
Defendant's argument does not establish the contrary. 
Defendant argues only that alleged disparities between Ms. 
Martinez's pre-trial statements and her trial testimony require 
the Court to reverse his convictions. 
The argument repeats on appeal the argument his counsel made 
below when attacking Ms. Martinez's credibility. However, 
determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight of 
evidence are "the exclusive function of the jury." State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). State v. Gorlick, 605 
P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1979) ("The function of this Court *is not to 
determine guilt or innocence, the weight to give conflicting 
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given 
defendant's testimony.'") (citation omitted). "[T]he existence 
of contradictory evidence or conflicting inferences does not 
warrant disturbing the jury's verdict." State v. Howell, 64 9 
P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). 
30ther witnesses provided corroborating evidence that 
defendant was at Ms. Martinez's apartment and physically 
assaulted her. Mr. Studham testified that he saw defendant 
walking away from Ms. Martinez apartment. When he entered the 
apartment, he saw a red mark on Ms. Martinez's face. 
Officer Slade also overheard some of defendant's telephone 
conversations with Ms. Martinez. He heard Ms. Martinez ask 
defendant why defendant hit her. Officer Slade heard defendant 
respond, "Well, because -," pause, and state that he was not 
stupid. This testimony corroborated parts of Ms. Martinez 
testimony. 
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Trial counsel argued the alleged inconsistencies in Ms. 
Martinez's testimony to the jury. The ]ury apparently resolved 
any question about her credibility against defendant. This Court 
may not reassess that determination, and defendant's invitation 
to do so does not demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the verdict. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT COUNSEL'S STRATEGY 
FOR DEALING WITH DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT OR THAT IT UNDERMINES 
CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME 
Defendant contends that counsel's failure to move to sever 
the aggravated assault charge from the felon-in-possession charge 
deprived him of the competent representation the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees. He further asserts without elaboration that the 
failure to sever "clearly" prejudiced his trial on the aggravated 
assault. Defendant has established neither of the Strickland 
elements.4 
A. Standard for reviewing counsel's performance. 
In order to establish that he did not receive the 
representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, defendant must 
prove two elements. First, he must identify the specific acts or 
4This claim affects only defendant's aggravated assault 
charge. Defendant has not argued that evidence of the aggravated 
assault would have been inadmissible in a separate trial on the 
felon-in-possession charge. Consequently, defendant cannot 
demonstrate that the failure to sever undermines confidence on 
that charge. 
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omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 
690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1984). In proving that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, defendant must rebut "a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland 466 U.S. 
at 689. This presumption arises from the requirement that "every 
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, 
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time." Id. The Court must give counsel wide latitude to make 
tactical decisions and "will not question strategic decisions 
unless there exists 'no reasonable basis' for the decision." 
Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) (quoting 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993)). 
The second element requires defendant to prove that "the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. See also, Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522. "This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "The defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.'' Id. at 694. 
The defendant's burden of proof in an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim is further magnified by his duty to assure an 
adequate record on appeal. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
1 16, 12 P.3d 92. Defendants may not rely on speculation to 
support allegations of ineffective assistance but must prove that 
the ineffective assistance is a "demonstrable reality," Parsons, 
871 P.2d at 526 (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1991)), and "where the record appears inadequate in any 
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply 
will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1 17. 
This Court has held that a trial attorney's failure to move 
to sever charges falls below Sixth Amendment standards if the 
motion "would likely have been granted had the motion been made." 
State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah App. 1990), affirmed, 
856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993) .5 To the extent Hallett stands for the 
proposition that counsel must always pursue a motion, including a 
severance motion, that would succeed, it incorrectly states the 
5The Utah Supreme Court's opinion addressed another ruling; 
it did not address this articulation of assessing counsel's 
performance in the context of severance motions. 
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analysis for assessing counsel's performance. The State 
recognizes that it bears a "substantial burden of persuasion" to 
justify overturning prior precedent. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
393, 398 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). That 
burden is met in this case. 
First, the Hallett rule rests on no controlling precedent. 
Instead, the Court relied solely on two appellate court decisions 
from other states. State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d at 706. 
More importantly, the Hallett decision contradicts 
controlling United States Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court 
precedent. As the precedents cited above demonstrate, the 
deficiency element focuses on the constitutional legitimacy of 
counsel's strategic decisions. The Hallett rule, however, 
focuses only on the meritoriousness of a motion that counsel did 
not file without considering whether the decision furthered a 
legitimate strategy. The Hallett rule, taken to its logical 
conclusion, creates a Sixth Amendment mandate that trial counsel 
pursue all motions that are likely to succeed. 
However, counsel may have many legitimate reasons for 
declining to make certain motions. For example* counsel may 
legitimately conclude not to object to the admission of 
inadmissible evidence because he believes, on balance, admitting 
the evidence works to his client's benefit. See, e.g., State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 497 U.S. 
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1024 (1990) . 
Similarly, counsel may legitimately conclude that succeeding 
on a severance motion will not best serve his client's interests. 
For example, counsel may have evidence impeaching a State's 
witness that would not be admissible m separate trials for each 
of two or more joined charges. Severing the charges would 
inhibit the defense's ability to impeach the witness in separate 
trials on some of the charges. On the other hand, leaving the 
charges joined would allow counsel to discredit the witness 
generally, improving the chances for acquittal on all of the 
charges. 
Because the Hallett rule requires assessing trial counsel's 
decisions about what motions to make solely on the basis of 
whether they would succeed without considering whether counsel 
had a legitimate reason not to file a meritorious motion, it 
misstates the correct legal analysis. Therefore, the Court 
should abandon the rule.6 
B. Defendant has not overcome the presumption that trial 
counsel performed within constitutional standards. 
The record clearly demonstrates that defense counsel made a 
strategic decision about how to handle the prior conviction and 
parole elements of the possession by a restricted person charge. 
60f course, the Hallett analysis is relevant to the second 
Strickland element. If the motion would not likely have 
succeeded, then failing to bring it cannot undermine confidence 
in the outcome. 
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The defense agreed to instruct the jury that defendant had a 
prior conviction for a violent felony and was on parole for any 
felony. As the trial court noted, the stipulation obviated the 
need to detail the prior felony to the jury (R. 149:4). 
Under either the specific Hallett analysis or the general 
Strickland analysis and on this record, defendant cannot 
establish constitutionally deficient performance. The Hallett 
rule obligates defendant to demonstrate that a motion to sever 
the counts likely would have succeeded. Defendant argues without 
analysis that the prior conviction had no relevance and would 
have been excluded in a separate trial on the aggravated assault 
charge. Aplt Br. at 27-28. 
The record is insufficient to support the argument. The 
record does not specify what the prior felony was. It may have 
been admissible for impeachment. See, e.g., State v. Betha, 951 
P.2d 611, 616-17 (Utah App. 1998) (prior felony admissible under 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) to impeach defendant).7 Moreover, 
without knowing any details of the prior felony, the Court cannot 
assess the validity of defendant's unsupported conclusion that it 
7Admittedly, defendant did not testify. However, the record 
demonstrates that the defense had not determined whether 
defendant would testify at the time counsel stipulated to the 
instruction on defendant's prior conviction. In his opening 
statement, counsel asked the jury to reserve judgment until it 
heard both sides of the story (R. 149:11). In his closing 
argument, defense counsel apologized for not providing both sides 
of the story (R. 149: 189). 
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would not have been admissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
Indeed, defendant's prior commitment to prison was admitted as 
foundation for Mr. Studham's ability to identify him (R. 149: 78-
79). Thus, it was admitted for a legitimate, non-character 
purpose as permitted by Utah R. Evid. 404(b). See, e.g., State 
v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, % 25, 993 P.2d 837. On this record, 
defendant has not demonstrated and cannot demonstrate deficient 
performance even under the Hallett analysis. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1 17 (on direct appellate review of trial 
counsel's performance, the Court resolves record ambiguities in 
favor of finding a legitimate strategic decision).8 
Defendant certainly has not demonstrated deficient 
performance under the Strickland analysis that affords counsel 
great deference in making strategic decisions. Counsel filed no 
Utah R. App. P. 23B motion to remand the case to develop the 
record concerning this counsel's strategy decision..9 However, 
the record is clear that counsel did not merely ignore the issue 
of defendant's prior conviction; instead, he made a strategic 
3In his closing argument, defense counsel relied on Mr. 
Studham's prior inmate status to challenge his credibility. 
9In a footnote, defendant asserts that he filed a 23B 
motion, which the Court denied. Aplt. Br. at 27 n.l. However, 
the State received no such motion and none appears on the Court 
docket. Moreover, the footnote asserts that an appellant named 
Coonce filed the 23B motion. It appears that defendant has 
mistakenly included an inapplicable footnote from a brief in an 
unrelated appeal. 
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choice about how to deal with it. That choice prevented the jury 
from hearing the details of defendant's prior violent felony: 
details that may well have prejudiced defendant far worse than 
the mere fact of a prior conviction. Defendant has not 
acknowledged that counsel made a strategic decision, let alone 
attempted to rebut the presumption that it was legitimate. 
Moreover, as argued, evidence that defendant had a prior 
conviction was already admitted and may have been admissible for 
other purposes. Counsel may well have concluded that the 
conviction would have been admitted, and that he could best serve 
his client by agreeing to the fact of the prior conviction to 
avoid revealing its details. 
C. Defendant has not demonstrated that admitting the evidence 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the aggravated 
assault charge. 
In order to succeed on his ineffective assistance claim, 
defendant must also demonstrate that counsel's failure to move to 
sever the counts undermines confidence in the outcome. The sum 
of defendant's prejudice argument is that, because the Utah 
Supreme Court found in State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 
1985), that the denial of Saunders' severance motion was 
prejudicial, reversible error, counsel's decision in this case 
not to seek severance necessarily undermines confidence in the 
outcome. 
The argument falls far short of the mark of demonstrating 
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prejudice to a "demonstrable reality." First, as explained, 
defendant has not argued, let alone established that the trial 
court would or even should have severed the two charges. For the 
reasons argued previously, it is impossible to make that 
determination on this record. Defendant's failure to establish 
that the motion would have succeeded independently defeats his 
claim. 
Second, defendant also presents no analysis demonstrating 
that defendant had a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result on the aggravated assault charge if it had been tried 
separately from the felon in possession charge. On this record, 
defendant cannot meet that standard. 
The jury knew defendant had a prior conviction because the 
State offered evidence that Mr. Studham knew defendant in prison 
when he explained how he could recognize defendant as the person 
he saw leaving the scene. As argued above, the evidence may also 
have been admissible for other purposes; however, the record is 
inadequate to assess its admissibility fully. 
Moreover, unlike Saunders where an accomplice's immunized 
testimony comprised the primary guilt evidence, the State here 
relied chiefly on the victim's testimony. The record contained 
no evidence of a motive for Ms. Martinez to inculpate defendant 
falsely. 
In addition, independent witness evidence supported at least 
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some of Ms. Martinez story. Officer Slade overheard defendant 
make a statement that amounted to an admission that defendant had 
at least hit Ms. Martinez. He also overheard defendant tell Ms. 
Martinez that she deserved "to get smacked." Mr. Studham saw 
defendant near the apartment and observed a red mark on Ms. 
Martinez's face where she reported defendant slapped her. 
On the other hand, defendant adduced no evidence directly 
rebutting any of the State's evidence. Defendant did not even 
deny being at Ms. Martinez's apartment. 
Finally, the jury learned of the prior conviction only 
through foundation to Mr. Studham's testimony and an instruction 
that the parties had stipulated to the felon-in-possession 
element of a prior conviction for a violent felony and that 
defendant was on parole for a felony. The jurors never learned 
about the felony's details. Defendant has not attempted to 
demonstrate how reference to a prison sentence and an instruction 
that the parties had stipulated to an element undermines 
confidence in the outcome. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the Court should affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
( D A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. tion (1Kb); substituted "A violation of Subsec-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, 9 10; tion UXaf for "Aggravated assault" and "sec-
1989, ch. 170, 5 2; 1996, ch. 291, i 5. ond degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2); 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- and added Subsection (3). 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added 'under Cross-References. — Attempt, § 76-4-101. 
circumstances not amounting to a violation of Possession of a dangerous weapon with in-
Subsection (lXa)" to the beginning of Subsec- tent to assault, § 76-10-507. 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon, 
firearm, or explosive — Persons not permitted to 
have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined m 
Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any explosive, chemical, 
or incendiary device as those terms are defined in Section 76-10-306 or 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or an explosive, chemical, 
or incendiary device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship. 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
tfifltory? C. 1953.76-10-603, enacted by L. 
fJJlch. 196, « 76-10*503; 1*77, ch. 82, 5 1; 
tf& ch. 210, 5 1; 1990, ch. 160, § 1; 1991, 
h i 7,4 li 1991, ch. 87,5 5; 1993, ch. 62, § 2; 
i £ k c h . l M 2; 1994,ch. 149,5 2;1997,ch. 
JJl 12; 1999, ch. 97, §8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ed, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "Sec-
tion 76-10-501" for "this part* in Subsections 
(IXa) and (2Xa) and made a stylistic change in 
Subsection (3Xb). 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3,1999, 
inserted "explosive, chemical, or incendiary de-
vice as those terms are defined in Section 
76-10-306* in Subsection (2Xa), inserted 
"chemical" in Subsection (2Kb), and made a 
minor stylistic change. 
Federal Law. — The Brady Handgun Vio-
lence Prevention Act, cited in Subsection 
(3XaXv), is codified mainly as 18 U S.C. § 921 
et seq. 
Cross-References, — Alien's right to hunt-
ing licenses and certificates, § 23-19-4. 
